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EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY IN MIXED STRATEGIES:
FROM MICROSCOPIC INTERACTIONS TO KINETIC
EQUATIONS.
JUAN PABLO PINASCO, MAURO RODRIGUEZ-CARTABIA, AND NICOLAS SAINTIER
Abstract. In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary
game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We
start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases
the probability of play the successful pure strategy used in the match. We
derive the Boltzmann equation which describes the macroscopic effects of this
microscopical rule, and we obtain a first order, nonlocal, partial differential
equation as the limit when the probability change goes to zero.
We study the relationship between this equation and the well known replica-
tor equations, showing the equivalence between the concepts of Nash equilibria,
stationary solutions of the partial differential equation, and the equilibria of
the replicator equations. Finally, we relate the long time behavior of solutions
to the partial differential equation and the stability of the replicator equations.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory, introduced in the 70s by Jonker and Taylor [38] and
Maynard Smith [37], is a beautiful mix of biology and game theory. Each player in
some population interact repeatedly with other players by playing a game, obtain-
ing a pay-off as reward or punishment of the pure strategies or actions they used.
We can consider now an evolutive mechanism, where agents with higher pay-offs
have more offsprings, or an adaptive one, where less successful players change strate-
gies and imitate the ones which performed better. This process is mathematically
formalized using systems of ordinary differential equations or difference equations.
Essentially, we have an equation describing the evolution of the proportion of play-
ers in each pure strategy, usually in the form of a rate equation where the growth
rate is proportional to the fitness of the strategy. The so-called replicator equations
(see (1.2) below) is a famous and well-studied example of such systems. However,
observe that the fitness also evolves, since it depends on the distribution of the pop-
ulation on the strategies, so interesting problems appears concerning the existence
and stability of fixed points, and their relationship with the Nash equilibria of the
underlying game. We refer the interested reader to the monographs [13, 21, 35] for
details.
Similar mechanisms when players use mixed strategies are less frequent in the
literature. Recently, in [33] we introduced an evolutive model for finitely many
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players, and we obtained a systems of ordinary differential equations describing the
evolution of the mixed strategy of each agents. The number of equations is then
proportional to the number of players. Thus, the limit of infinitely many players
seems to be intractable in this way. However, a simple hydrodynamic interpretation
is possible, leading to a first order partial differential equation modeling the strategy
updates: we can think of the players as immersed in a fluid, flowing in the simplex
∆ of mixed strategies, following the drift induced by the gradient of the fitness of
the strategies given the distribution of the whole population on this simplex.
Let us present a brief outline of our model and the main results in this work,
and see Section §2 for the precise definitions, notations, and previous results. We
consider a population of agents playing a finite, symmetric, zero sum game, with
pay-off matrix A. Each player starts with a given mixed strategy, i.e. a probability
distribution on the set of pure strategies. They are randomly matched in pairs, and
select at random a pure strategy using their respective mixed strategies which they
use to play the game. After the match, each player changes its mixed strategy by
adding a small quantity h to the winner strategy, and reducing the loosing one in the
same amount. Some care is necessary in the definition of h to avoid values greater
than one, or less than zero. This is needed only near the boundary of the simplex
so we replace the constant h by a function h(p) satisfying h(p) < dist(p, ∂∆).
This adaptive, microscopic rule, first introduced and analyzed in [33] for finitely
many players, induces a flow of the players in the simplex, whose study is the main
purpose of this paper.
Let us call uht the distribution of agents on the simplex. We can think of u
h
t (p)dp
as the probability to find a player with an strategy q in a cube of area dp centered
at p. Now, it is possible to describe the time evolution of uht with a Boltzmann-like
equation, whose collision part reflects the dynamics in the changes of strategies due
to encounters. This procedure is strongly inspired by the kinetic theory of rarefied
gases and granular flows and has been successfully implemented to model a wide
variety of phenomena in applied sciences (see e.g. [3, 4, 5, 30, 31, 32] and the
surveys in Ref. [27] for further details).
However, Boltzmann-like equation are challenging objects to study. Performing
the so-called grazing limit or quasi-invariant limit (see [14, 15, 16, 30]), we can
approximate it by a Fokker-Planck equation which is satisfied by vt = limh→0 uht/h.
Besides the intrinsic stochastic nature of the interactions, we can add a small noise
in the agents’ movements. The Fokker-Planck equation then reads
∂vt
∂t
+ div(F [vt]vt) = λ
d∑
i,j=1
Qi,j
∂2
∂pi∂pj
(Gvt),
where Q and G depend on vt and the intensity of the noise, λ ≥ 0 depends on the
ratio of the noise to the convection term, and the vector-field F [vt], which depends
on vt, is given by
F [vt] = h(p)[pieTi Ap¯(t) + p¯i(t)eTi Ap],
with p¯(t) =
∫
∆
p dvt(p) the mean strategy at time t.
In particular, when λ = 0, i. e., when the convection term dominates the noise,
we obtain the first order, nonlocal, mean field equation
(1.1)
∂v
∂t
+ div(F [vt]vt) = 0.
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Existence and uniqueness of solutions for (5.1) follows by using the classical ideas
of [7, 17, 28] (see also [9, 20]).
One of the main focus of the paper is the study of the long time behavior of
solutions to (1.1) and the stability of the stationary solutions of the form v = δp,
where δp is a Dirac mass at p;, which corresponds to the case where all the players
use the same mixed strategy p.
These issues are closely related to the behaviour of the integral curves of the
vector-field F . It is worth noticing the close resemblance of F with the replicator
equations
(1.2)
dpi
dt
= pi(e
T
i Ap− pTAp).
We can thus expect a relationship between the long-time behaviour of the solutions
of (1.1) and of the solutions to the replicator equations (1.2). A well-known result
in evolutionary game theory, known as the Folk Theorem (see [22] and Theorem 2.1
below), relates the long-time behaviour of the solution of the replicator equation to
the Nash equilibria of the zero-sum game with pay-off matrix A.
Our first main theorem can be thought of as a generalization of the Folk Theorem.
Indeed we prove that the following statements are equivalent:
• p is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
• δp is an stationary solution to (1.1),
• p is an equilibrium of the replicator equations (1.2),
• Ap = 0, where A is the pay-off matrix of the game.
Our second main theorem states that if vt is a solution to (1.1), then the mean
strategy of the population,
p¯ =
∫
∆
pdvt
is a solution to the replicator equations (1.2) while it stays in {h = c}. See Section
§5 for the precise statement of both theorems.
Finally, we show some results about the asymptotic behaviour of the solution vt
of (4.6) and their relationship with the game with pay-off matrix A.
In the simplest case, namely the case of a two-strategies game, we can precisely
describe the asymptotic behavior of vt. Then, we turn our attention to symmetric
games with an arbitrary number of strategies. Following [35], a zero sum symmet-
ric game has no stable interior equilibria, and periodic solutions to the replicator
equations appear as in the classical rock-paper-scissor. So, we will show that if
all the trajectories of the replicator equations are periodic orbits, then vt is also
periodic.
Let us compare briefly other works dealing with similar issues. To our knowledge,
the first work dealing with evolutionary game theory for mixed strategies is due
to Boccabella, Natalini and Pareschi [6]. They considered an integro-differential
equation modeling the evolution of a population on the simplex of mixed strategies
following the idea behind the replicator equations. That is, the population in a
fixed strategy p will increase (respectively, decrease) if the expected pay-off given
the distribution of agents in the simplex is greater than (resp., lower than) the
mean pay-off of the population. A full analysis of the stability and convergence
to equilibria is performed for binary games. Let us remark that their dynamics
inherit several properties of the replicator equations, and if some mixed strategy p
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has zero mass in the initial datum, the solution will remains equal to zero forever.
So, agents cannot learn the optimal way of play, and they are faced to extinction
or not depending on the mixed strategies which are present in the initial datum. In
some sense, this is equivalent to consider each mixed strategy as a pure one in a new
game. The mathematical theory for infinitely many pure strategies was developed
by Oeschssler and Riedel in [29], and studied later by Cressman [12], Ackleh and
Cleveland [11], and also Mendoza-Palacios and Herna´ndez-Lerma [25].
Finally, we can cite also [1, 24, 34, 40] where binary (or more general) games
have pay-offs depending on some real parameters, and they study the distribution
of players on this space of parameters (say, wealth, velocity, opinion, among many
other characteristics). Now, the strategy that they play in the binary game is
selected using partial or total knowledge of the global distribution of agents. For
example, we can assume that x represent the wealth of an agent, and in the game
they will cooperate or not depending on the median of the society; if they cooperate,
a fraction of wealth is transferred from the richer to the poorer, on the other hand,
if they does not cooperate, no changes occur.
The paper is organized as follow. In Section §2 we first recall some basic results
concerning game theory, the replicator equations and measure theory to make the
paper self-contained. We then present in Section §3 the model we are concerned
with, and we deduce in Section §4 the partial differential equations allowing to study
the long-time behaviour of the system. In Section §5 we prove the generalization of
the Folk Theorem. Section §6 is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behaviour
and the stability of the stationary solutions to the mean-field equation (1.1) and
their relationship with the replicator equations, and we present agent based and
numerical solutions of the model. The lengthy or technical proofs of existence and
uniqueness of solutions of the relevant equations are postponed to the Appendix
for a better readability of the paper.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Preliminaries on game theory. We briefly recall some basics about game
theory and refer to the excellent references available on general game theory for
more details (e. g. [23]). Since we are concerned in this paper with two players,
symmetric, zero-sum, finite games in normal form, we will limit our exposition to
this setting.
A two-players finite game in normal form consists of two players named I and
II, two finite sets S1 = {s1, . . . , sd1} and S2 = {s˜1, . . . , s˜d2}, and two matrices
A = (aij)1≤i≤d1,1≤j≤d2 , B = (bij)1≤i≤d1,1≤j≤d2 ∈ Rd1×d2 . The elements of S1
(respectively, S2) are the pure strategies of the first (resp., second) player and
models the actions he can choose. Once both players have chosen a pure strategy
each, say I chosed si ∈ S1 and II chosed s˜j ∈ S2, then I receives the pay-off
u1(si, s˜j) := aij and II receives u
2(si, s˜j) =: bij . Thus the pay-off received by each
player depends on the pure strategies chosen by each players and on their pay-off
functions u1 and u2. It is convenient to identify si with the the i-th canonical vector
ei of Rd1 , and s˜j with the the j-th canonical vector ej of Rd2 . This way the pay-off
of I and II are
u1(si, s˜j) = e
T
i Aej = aij , u
2(si, s˜j) = e
T
i Bej = bij .
The game is said:
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• symmetric, when I and II are indistinguishable both from the point of view
of the sets of actions available and the pay-off functions:
S1 = S2 =: S, and
u1(s, s˜) = u2(s˜, s) for any (s, s˜) ∈ S × S.
This last equality means that A = BT .
• zero-sum if u1 + u2 = 0, i. e. B = −A. This means that the gain of one
player is exactly the loss of the other one.
Notice in particular that the game is symmetric and zero-sum if and only if AT =
−A, in other words, the matrix A is antisymmetric.
We illustrate the above definitions with the popular Rock-Paper-Scissor game.
This is a two-players zero-sum game with pure strategies
S1 = S2 = {Rock, Paper, Scissor} = {e1, e2, e3}
(we identifed as before each pure strategy with the canonical vectors of R3.) We
then define the pay-off matrix A of the first player as
(2.1) A =
 0 −a bb 0 −a
−a b 0

where a, b > 0, and the pay-off matrix of the second player is B = −A being he
game zero-sum by definition. For instance if I plays Paper and II plays Rock then
I earns a21 = b (so II looses b), and if I plays Scissor and II Rock then I earns
a32 = −a (and thus II gains a). When a = b then A is antisymmetric meaning that
the game is symmetric.
A central concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium
is a pair (s∗, s˜∗) ∈ S1×S2 such that neither player has incentive to change its action
given the action of the other player: there hold at the same time
u1(s∗, s˜∗) ≥ u1(s, s˜∗) for any s ∈ S1, s 6= s∗,
and
u2(s∗, s˜∗) ≥ u2(s∗, s˜) for any s˜ ∈ S2, s˜ 6= s˜∗.
A Nash equlibrium thus models a status quo situation. When the above inequalities
are strict, the Nash equilibrim is said to be strict. However, there not always exists
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies as can be seen for instance in the Rock-
Paper-Scissor game (2.1): by symmetry, if both players are playing some fixed pure
strategies, both have an incentive to change to another strategy.
The main mathematical issue here is the lack of convexity of the strategy spaces
S1 and S2. This motivates the introduction of mixed strategies as probability
measures over the set of pure strategies: a mixed strategy for I is a vector p =
(p1, . . . , pd1) where pi is the probability to play the i-th pure strategy si. Thus
pi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i pi = 1. Remember that we identify the pure strategies with the
canonical vectors of Rd1 . Let
∆1 = {p = (p1, . . . , pd1) ∈ Rd1 : p1, . . . , pd1 ≥ 0,
∑
i
pi = 1}
be the simplex in Rd1 , and similarly we denote ∆2 the simplex in Rd2 . We extend
the pay-off functions u1 and u2 to ∆1 × ∆2 as expected pay-offs in the following
6 JUAN PABLO PINASCO, MAURO RODRIGUEZ-CARTABIA, AND NICOLAS SAINTIER
way: for (p, p˜) ∈ ∆1 ×∆2,
u1(p, p˜) =
∑
i,j
pip˜ju
1(si, s˜j) =
∑
ij
pip˜jaij = p
TAp˜
and similarly,
u2(p, p˜) = pTBp˜.
We can then extend the notion of Nash equlibrium to mixed strategies saying
that (p∗, p˜∗) ∈ ∆1 ×∆2 is a Nash equilibrium if at the same time
u1(p∗, p˜∗) ≥ u1(p, p˜∗) for any p ∈ ∆1, p 6= p∗,
and
u2(p∗, p˜∗) ≥ u2(p∗, p˜) for any p˜ ∈ ∆2, p˜ 6= p˜∗.
Nash’celebrated Theorem states that a finite game in normal form always has a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, we refer to [19] for a simple proof. Moreover,
when the game is symmetric (so that S := S1 = S2) there always exists a Nash
equilibrium of the form (p∗, p∗) ∈ ∆ × ∆. For instance, in the symmetric Rock-
Paper-Scissor game (2.1) with a = b, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is
p∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). This means that no players has an incentive to deviate when
they choose their action with equiprobability. Of course, for zero sum games, the
existence of an equilibria goes back to Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem.
2.2. The replicator equations. The concept of Nash equilibrium is quite static
and computationally challenging. Various dynamical processes have been studied to
model the process of learning, the discovering a Nash equilibrium by an individual.
A popular one is a system of ordinary differential equations known as replicator
equation that was introduced by Taylor and Jonker in [38] (see also [36, 37]).
Consider a large population of individuals randomly matched in pairs to play a
two-player symmetric game with pay-off matrix A ∈ Rd×d. The players are divided
into d groups according to the pure strategy they use. Let p(t) = (p1(t), . . . , pd(t)),
where pi(t) is the proportion of individuals playing the i-th pure strategy ei at time
t. We want to write down an equation for p′i(t), i = 1, . . . , d, modelling the fact
that individuals playing a strategy with high fitness should be favored and they
will produce more offsprings than individuals playing a low fitness strategy.
In the case of the replicator equation, the fitness of an individual playing the i-th
strategy is defined as the difference between the expected pay-off received against
a randomly selected individual, and the expected pay-off received by a randomly
selected individual playing against another randomly selected individual. Thus,
the fitness of the i-th strategy ei is e
T
i Ap(t) − p(t)TAp(t). Notice that the fitness
depends on the distribution of strategies in the whole population and change in
time. We then assume that agents with positive (respectively, negative) fitness has
a reproductive advantage (resp., disadvantage) leading to their reproduction (resp.,
death) at a rate proportional to their fitness. We thus arrive at the replicator
equations,
(2.2)
d
dt
pi = pi(e
T
i Ap− pTAp) i = 1, . . . , d.
It is easily shown that if p(0) ∈ ∆, where ∆, then p(t) ∈ ∆ for all time t ≥ 0.
There is a strong connection between the rest point of the system (2.2) and the
Nash equilibria of the game with pay-off matrix A as stated in the so-called Folk
Theorem:
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Theorem 2.1. Let us consider a two player symmetric game in normal form with
finitely many pure strategies. Then it hold
(1) if (p, p) ∈ ∆×∆ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, then p is a rest point of
(2.2),
(2) if (p, p) is a strict Nash equilibrium, then it is an asymptotically stable rest
point of (2.2),
(3) if the rest point p is the limit as t→ +∞ of a trajectory lying in the interior
of ∆ then (p, p) is a Nash equilibrium,
(4) if the rest point p is stable then (p, p) is a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, none of the converse statement holds.
We refer to the surveys [22, 26]) for a proof and related results on the replicator
equations.
2.3. Preliminaries on probability measures and transport equations. We
denote by M(∆) the space of bounded Borel measures on ∆ and by P(∆) the
convex cone of probability measures on ∆. We denote by ‖.‖TV the total variation
norm on M(∆) defined as
‖µ‖TV = sup
‖φ‖∞≤1
∫
∆
φdµ.
However, the total variation norm will be too strong for our purpose and it will
be more convenient to work with the weak*-convergence. We say that a sequence
(µn)n ⊂ P(∆) converges weak* to µ ∈ P(∆) if∫
∆
φdµn →
∫
∆
φdµ for any φ ∈ C(∆).
It is well-known that, since ∆ is compact, that P(∆) is compact for the weak*
topology. The weak*-topology can be metricized in many ways. It will be conve-
nient to consider the Monge-Kantorovich or Wasserstein distance on P(∆) defined
as
W1(u, v) := sup
(∫
∆
ϕ(p) du(p)−
∫
∆
ϕ(p) dv(p)
)
,
where the supremum is taken over all the Lipschitz functions ϕ with Lipschitz
constant Lip(ϕ) ≤ 1. It is known that W1 is indeed a distance that metricizes the
weak*-topology, see [41].
We will work in this paper with first order partial differential equations of the
form
(2.3) ∂tµt + div(v(x)µt) = 0 in Rd
with a given initial condition µ0 ∈ P (Rd) and where v : Rd → Rd is a given vector-
field usually assumed to be bounded and globally Lipschitz. A solution to this
equation is µ ∈ C([0,+∞), P (Rd)) satisfying∫
Rd
φdµt =
∫
Rd
φdµ0 +
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
v(x)∇φ(x) dµs(x)ds for any φ ∈ C∞c (Rd).
Let Tt : Rd → Rd be the flow of v defined for any x ∈ Rd by
d
dt
Tt(x) = v(Tt(x)) for any t ∈ R,
Tt=0(x) = x.
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It is well-known (see e.g. [41]) that equation (2.3) has a unique solution given
by µt = Tt]µ0, the push-forward of µ0 by Tt. This means that
∫
Rd φdµt =∫
Rd φ(Tt(x)) dµ0(x) for any φ bounded and measurable. This result, which is simply
a restatement of the standard characteristic method, can be generalized to deal with
equations with a non-autonomous vector-field v(t, x) assumed to be continuous and
globally Lipschitz in x, uniformly in t.
3. Description of the model
We consider a population of agents. Two randomly selected agents meet, they
play a game, and then update their strategy taking into account the outcome of the
game. The game played during an interaction is always the same. It is a two-player,
zero-sum game with a set {s1, . . . , sd} of pure strategies and whose pay-off is given
by a matrix A = (alm)1≤l,m≤d ∈ Rd×d. We will assume the game is symmetric i.e.
AT = −A, and with out loss of generality we take |alm| ≤ 1 for any l,m = 1, . . . , d.
Each agent i has a mixed strategy p = (p1, . . . , pd) ∈ ∆. Here pl is the probability
that agent i plays the l-th pure strategy sl.
When two agents i and j meet and play the game, they update their respective
strategies using a myopic rule, both agents increase by δh(p) > 0 the probability of
playing the winning strategy and decrease by δh(p) > 0 the loosing one. Here, δ is
a small positive parameter, and h(p) is a positive function of p, to ensure that the
updated strategy p∗ remains in ∆. For instance, we can take
h(p) := min
{ d∏
i=1
pi, c
}
.(3.1)
where c < 1 is a positive constant, and hence h(p)→ 0 as p→ ∂∆.
More precisely, if the pure strategies sl and sm were played, agent i only updates
the probabilities pl, pm to p
∗
l , p
∗
m as follows
p∗l = pl + almδh(p)
p∗m = pm − almδh(p),
(3.2)
Agent j updates the probabilities p˜l, p˜m in the same way. Notice that probabilities
are raised/lowered proportionally to the gain/loss almδ.
To model the choice made by agent i of which pure strategy to play, we fix a
random variable ζ uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and then consider the random
vector f(ζ; p) = (f1(ζ; p), . . . , fd(ζ; p)) where
(3.3) fi(ζ; p) :=
{
1 if
∑
j<i pj ≤ ζ <
∑
j≤i pj ,
0 otherwise.
Notice that fi(ζ; p) = 1 with probability pi. Agent j fixes in the same way a
random variable ζ˜ uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Then f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜) ∈ [−1, 1]
is the pay-off of i when playing against j (recall that the coefficient of A belongs
to [−1, 1]). We can thus rewrite the updating rule (3.2) as
p∗i =

pi + δh(p)f(ζ, p)
TAf(ζ˜, p˜) if fi(ζ, p) = 1 and fi(ζ˜, p˜) = 0,
pi − δh(p)f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜) if fi(ζ, p) = 0 and fi(ζ˜, p˜) = 1,
pi otherwise
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We can also add a small noise to p∗i in the following way. We fix r > 0 small
enough so that (δ + r) < 1, and a smooth function G such that G(p) ≤ pi for any
p ∈ ∆ and any i like e.g. G(p) = h(p). We then consider a uniformly distributed
random vector q in ∆. The additive random noise is then taken as r(qi−1/d)G(p).
We thus arrive at the following interaction rule:
Definition 3.1. Consider an agent with strategy p interacting with an agent with
strategy p˜ through the game defined by the matrix A. They update their strategies
from p to p∗, and p˜ to p˜∗, as follows
p∗ = p+ δh(p)f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
f(ζ, p)− f(ζ˜, p˜)
)
+ r(q −~1/d)G(p),
p˜∗ = p˜+ δh(p˜)f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
f(ζ, p)− f(ζ˜, p˜)
)
+ r(q˜ −~1/d)G(p˜),
(3.4)
where ~1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rd.
Let us remark that p∗ and p˜∗ are random variables. Indeed there are two sources
of randomness in the updating rule. First, there is the presence of the random
variables ζ and ζ˜ which model the fact that the players choose the pure strategy
they are about to play at random using their mixed strategy p, p˜. The second factor
of randomness is the noise r(q −~1/d)G(p).
Let us verify now that p∗ remains in the simplex ∆.
Lemma 3.1. The strategy p∗ belongs to ∆.
Proof. Starting from
p∗ = p+ δh(p)f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
f(ζ, p)− f(ζ˜, p˜)
)
+ r(q −~1/d)G(p),
we have, for any i = 1, . . . , d,
p∗i ≤ pi + δh(p) + rG(p) ≤ pi + (1− pi)(δ + r) ≤ 1,
p∗i ≥ pi − δh(p)− rG(p) ≥ pi(1− δ − r) ≥ 0.
To conclude the proof, let us show that
∑d
i=1 p
∗
i = 1. Since f(ζ, p) and f(ζ˜, p˜)
are vectors whose components are all equal to zero but one which is equal to one,
we have
d∑
i=1
[
fi(ζ, p)− fi(ζ˜, p˜)
]
= 0,
and, since q ∈ ∆, we have
d∑
i=1
(qi − 1/d) = 0.
Then
d∑
i=1
p∗i =
d∑
i=1
pi + δhf(ζ)
TAf(ζ˜)
( d∑
i=1
fi(ζ)− fi(ζ˜)
)
+ rG(p)
d∑
i=1
(qi − 1/d) = 1.

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4. A Boltzmann-like equation and its grazing limit.
We now consider an infinite population of agents interacting through the game
defined by the matrix A and updating after each interaction their strategies ac-
cording to the rule (3.4). We denote ut the distribution of agents in the simplex
of mixed strategies at time t. Notice that ut is thus a probability measure on ∆.
Intuitively, if this probability is regular enough, we can consider that ut is its den-
sity, and ut(p)dp is roughly the proportion of agents whose strategy belongs to a
neighborhood of volume dp around p.
4.1. Boltzmann-type equation. Let us find an equation describing the time evo-
lution of ut. However, since ut is a measure, we only hope to find an equation in
weak form, that is, for each observable
∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p), with ϕ ∈ C(∆,R). Observe
that this integral is the mean value at time t of some macroscopic quantity. For
instance if ϕ ≡ 1 then ∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p) = ut(∆) is the total mass of ut, which should
be conserved. If ϕ(p) = p then
∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p) =
∫
∆
p dut(p) is the mean strategy
in the population. We will see later that it is strongly related to the replicator
equation (2.2).
We can also think of ut as the law of the stochastic process Pt giving the strategy
of an arbitrary agent. Then
∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p) = E[φ(Pt)] is the expected value of φ.
We assume that interactions take place following a unit rate Poisson process.
Notice that if the Poisson process has constant rate, we can always assume that the
rate is one up to a linear time re-scaling. Then it is standard to show that
(4.1)
d
dt
∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p) =
∫
∆2
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)] dut(p)dut(p˜),
see the book [30] for more details.
The following result states the existence and uniqueness of a solutions to this
equation
Theorem 4.1. For any initial condition u0 ∈ P(∆) there exists a unique u ∈
C([0,∞),P(∆)) ∩ C1((0,∞),M(∆)) satisfying∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p) =
∫
∆
ϕ(p) du0(p) +
∫ t
0
∫
∆2
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)] dus(p)dus(p˜)ds
for any test-function ϕ ∈ C(∆).
The proof of this result is classical and mainly based on Banach fixed-point theorem.
It can also be proved viewing (4.1) as an ordinary differential equation in a Banach
space following Bressan’s insight [8] (see also [2]). For the reader convenience we
provide the main steps of the proof in Appendix.
4.2. Grazing limit. We fix an initial condition u0 ∈ P(∆) and denote uδ the
solution of (4.1) given by Theorem 4.1 corresponding to interaction rules (3.4).
Notice that when δ ' 0, |p∗ − p| ' 0 so that ϕ(p∗)−ϕ(p) ' (p∗ − p)ϕ′(p) + 12 (p∗ −
p)2ϕ′′(p). Taking its expected value we thus obtain
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)] ' E[p∗ − p]ϕ′(p) + 1
2
E[(p∗ − p)2]ϕ′′(p).
Using the rules (3.4) to calculate the expectation and considering the new time scale
τ = δt, we obtain that we can approximate (4.1) when δ ' 0 by a local equation of
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the form
(4.2) ∂τv + div(F [v] v) = λ
2
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ij(G
2 v).
Here λ := r2/δ, the vector-field F [v] has components
Fi[vτ ](p) =
d∑
k=1
h(p)aik(pip¯k(τ) + pkp¯i(τ))
= h(p)(pie
T
i Ap¯(τ) + p¯i(τ)e
T
i Ap),
(4.3)
being
p¯(τ) =
∫
∆
p dvτ (p)
the mean-strategy at time τ , and the diffusion coefficient Qij is the covariance of
the distribution of θ, namely
(4.4) Qij :=
∫
∆
(qi − 1/d)(qj − 1/d) dθ(q).
We say that v ∈ C([0,∞),P(∆)) is a solution to equation (4.2) if∫
∆
ϕ(p) dvt(p)−
∫
∆
ϕ(p) du0
=
∫ t
0
∫
∆
∇ϕ(p) · F(p, s) dvs(p) + λ
2
d∑
i,j=1
Qij
∫
∆
∂ijϕ(p)G
2(p) dvs(p)ds
(4.5)
for any ϕ ∈ C2(∆).
The above procedure is relatively well-known in the literature as grazing-limit. It
has been introduced in the context of socio and econophysics modelling by Toscani
[39], see also [30]. It can be rigourously justified to obtain the following Theorem:
Theorem 4.2. Given an initial condition u0 ∈ P(∆), let uδ be the solution to
equation (4.1) given by Theorem 4.1 corresponding to interaction rule (3.4).
Assume that, as δ, r → 0, we have r2/δ → λ. Let τ = δt and define uδτ := uδt .
Then there exists v ∈ C([0,∞),P(∆)) such that, as δ → 0 up to a subsequence,
uδ → v in C([0, T ],P(∆)) for any T > 0. Moreover, v is a weak solution to equation
(4.2) in the sense of (4.5).
Eventually, if r2/δα → λ > 0 for some α ∈ (0, 1), then re-scaling time consider-
ing τ = δαt, we obtain that uδ → v as before with v solution to
d
dτ
v =
λ
2
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ij(G
2 v).
On the other hand, if r2/δ → 0, then re-scaling time we obtain that uδ → v with v
solution to
(4.6) ∂τv + div(F [v] v) = 0.
In the rest of the paper we will focus in this last case, corresponding to the pure
transport equation (4.6). Observe that this is a first order, nonlocal, mean field
equation, and following a classic strategy going back at least to Neunzert and Wik
[28], see also [7, 9, 17], we can prove directly the well-posedness of equation (4.6).
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Given v ∈ C([0,+∞], P (∆)) we denote T vt the flow of the vector field F [v(t)](x)
namely
d
dt
T vt (x) = F [v(t)](T vt (x)), T vt=0(x) = x.
It can be proved (see Appendix) that T vt (x) ∈ ∆ for any t ≥ 0. The result is the
following:
Theorem 4.3. For any initial condition u0 ∈ P (∆), equation (4.6) has a unique
solution u in C([0,+∞], P (∆)). This solution satisfies u(t) = T vt ]u0 for any t ≥ 0.
Moreover, the solutions depend continuously on the initial conditions. Indeed,
there exists a continuous function r : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) with r(0) = 1 such that
for any pair of solutions v(1) and v(2) to equation (4.6) there holds
W1(v
(1)(t), v(2)(t)) ≤ r(t)W1(v(1)(0), v(2)(0)).
The proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 can be found in the Appendix.
5. Relationships between the mean-field equation, the replicator
equations, and the game.
In this section we study the relationships between:
• solutions v ∈ C([0,+∞],P(∆)) to the mean-field equation equation (4.6),
or in weak form,
(5.1)
d
dt
∫
∆
φdvt =
∫
∆
F [v]∇φdvt for any φ ∈ C(∆),
where the vector-field F [v] is given by (4.3),
• solutions to the replicator equations (2.2)
d
dt
pi = pi((Ap)i − pTAp) i = 1, . . . , d,
• Nash equilibria of the symmetric zero-sum game with pay-off matrix A.
We first relate the stationary solution to the mean-field equation (4.6) of the
form δq with q an interior point and the Nash equilibria of the game. Indeed, we
will prove that δq is a stationary solution if and only if q is a Nash equilibrium.
We then show that the mean strategy of the population satisfies the replicator
equations. Finally, we will study the case of a two-strategies game, where we can
precisely describe the asymptotic behavior of vt, and then we show that, for gener-
alizations of the classical rock-paper-scissor where the trajectories of the replicator
equations are closed orbits, vt is also periodic.
5.1. Nash equilibria and stationary solutions. Given some probability mea-
sure v ∈ P(∆), we will slightly abuse notation considering v as the time-continuous
function from [0,+∞) to ∆ constantly equal to v.
Definition 5.1. We say that v ∈ P(∆) is an equilibrium or stationary solution of
the transport equation (5.1) if it is a solution of (5.1), that is, if
(5.2)
∫
∆
F [v](p)∇φ(p) dv(p) = 0 for all φ ∈ C(∆).
We will mainly be interested in the case of equilibrium of the form v = δq for
some interior point q ∈ ∆.
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Theorem 5.1. Let q be an interior point of ∆. The following statements are
equivalent:
(1) q is an equilibrium of the replicator equations (2.2),
(2) δq is an equilibrium of equation (5.1) in the sense of definition 5.1,
(3) q belongs to the null space of the matrix A,
(4) q is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric zero-sum game with pay-off matrix
A.
Proof. Let us first rewrite condition (5.2) for δq to be an equilibrium of equation
(5.1). First notice that, for v = δq, the mean strategy is obviously q. Then from
definition (4.3) of the vector-field Fi[δq] we have for any p ∈ ∆ and any time t ≥ 0
that
Fi[δq](p, t) =
d∑
k=1
h(p)aik(piqk + pkqi).
In particular with p = q we have
Fi[δq](q, t) =
d∑
k=1
h(q)aik(qiqk + qkqi) = 2h(q)qie
t
iAq = 2h(q)qi(e
t
iAq − qTAq)
where we used that A is antisymmetric so that qTAq = 0. We can now rewrite
condition (5.2). Notice that∫
∆
F [δq]∇φdδq = F [δq](q)∇φ(q) = 2h(q)
d∑
i=1
qi(e
t
iAq − qTAq)∂iφ(q).
Recall that q is an interior point of ∆ so that h(q) 6= 0. We thus obtain that δq is
an equilibrium of equation (5.1) if and only if
(5.3)
d∑
i=1
qi(e
t
iAq − qTAq)∂iφ(q) = 0 for all φ ∈ C(∆).
We can now easily prove that statements (1) and (2) are equivalent. Indeed
if q is an equilibrium of the replicator equations then qi((Aq)i − qTAq) = 0 for
any i = 1, . . . , d and (5.3) holds. On the other hand if δq is an equilibrium of the
equation (5.1), i.e. condition (5.3) holds for any φ ∈ C(∆), then taking φ(p) = pi
we obtain qi(e
t
iAq−qTAq) = 0 for any i = 1, . . . , d so we get that q is an equilibrium
of the replicator equation.
We can also prove that (1) and (3) are equivalent. Indeed if (1) holds, then
qi(e
t
iAq − qTAq) = 0 for any i = 1, . . . , d. Since qTAq = 0 and qi > 0 for any
i = 1, . . . , d, being q an interior point, the previous equality can be rewritten as
etiAq = 0 for any i = 1, . . . , d i.e. Aq = 0. This prove that (1) implies (3). On the
other hand, if Aq = 0, then etiAq = 0 for any i = 1, . . . , d so we obtain that (5.3)
holds.
It remains to show that Aq = 0 if and only if q is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose
that Aq = 0. Then for any p ∈ ∆,
pTAq = p ·~0 = 0 = qTAq.
Thus, playing any other strategy than q against q does not increase the pay-off.
This means that q is a Nash equilibrium. Let us now assume that q is a Nash
equilibrium and let us prove that (Aq)i = 0 for any i = 1, . . . , d. If (Aq)i > 0 then
14 JUAN PABLO PINASCO, MAURO RODRIGUEZ-CARTABIA, AND NICOLAS SAINTIER
eTi Aq > 0 = q
TAq contradicting that q is a Nash equilibrium. If (Aq)i < 0 then
recalling that A is antisymmetric,
0 = qTAq =
d∑
k=1
qk(Aq)k = qi(Aq)i +
∑
k 6=i
qk(Aq)k.
Since qk > 0 for any k = 1, . . . , d there must exists some l ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that
(Aq)l > 0 and this is not possible.
The proof is finished. 
5.2. Evolution of the mean strategy and the replicator equations. The
method of characteristic yields that the solution to equation (5.1) is
(5.4) vt = Tt]v0
where Tt is the flow of the vector-field F [vt](p). This vector-field is the same as
the one in the replicator equations but with the mean-strategy p¯(t) depending on
the distribution vt of strategies. The next result shows that p¯(t) satisfies (up to a
constant) the replicator equations.
Theorem 5.2. Consider a solution v ∈ C([0,∞),P(∆)) of the transport equation
(5.1) staying away from the boundary ∂∆ of ∆ up to some time T > 0 i.e.
(5.5) dist
(
supp(vt), ∂∆
)
≥ c1/d 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where c is defined in (3.1). Then the mean strategy p¯(t) =
∫
∆
p dvt(p) is a solution
of the replicator equation:
d
dt
p¯i(t) = 2cp¯i(t)e
T
i Ap¯(t) i = 1, . . . , d.(5.6)
Notice that (5.6) is not exactly the replicator systems due to the constant 2c, but
becomes so after the time-scale change τ = 2ct.
Proof. Let Ts,t be the flow of the vector-field F [v](t, x) i.e.
d
dt
Ts,t(p) = F [v](Ts,t(p), t), Ts,s(p) = p.
We also let Tt(p) = T0,t(p) and denote T it (p), i = 1, . . . , d, its components. Then
vt = Tt]v0. It follows that for any i = 1, . . . , d,
p¯i(t) =
∫
∆
pi dvt(p) =
∫
∆
T it (p) dv0(p),
so that
d
dt
p¯i =
∫
∆
d
dt
T it (p) dv0(p) =
∫
∆
Fi[v](Ts,t(p), t) dv0(p)
=
d∑
k=1
∫
∆
h
(
Tt(q)
)
aik
(
T it (q)p¯k(t) + T kt (q)p¯i(t)
)
dv0(q)
=
d∑
k=1
∫
∆
h(p)aik(pip¯k(t) + pkp¯i(t)) dvt(p),
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where we used once again that vt = Tt]v0. According to assumption (5.5) we have
for any p in the support of vt that pi ≥ c1/d for i = 1, . . . , d, which implies that
h(p) = c. Thus,
1
c
d
dt
p¯i(t) =
d∑
k=1
∫
∆
aik(pip¯k(t) + pkp¯i(t)) dvt(p)
=2
d∑
k=1
aikp¯i(t)p¯k(t)
which is (5.6). 
5.3. Two strategies games. Let us consider the case of a symmetric game with
two strategies. The pay-off matrix A is then
A =
(
0 b
−b 0
)
for some b ∈ R. Notice that if b > 0 (resp. b < 0) then the first (respectively,
second) strategy strictly dominates the other. We thus expect that all agents end
up playing the dominating strategy except those initially playing exclusively the
loosing strategy and they cannot move due to the presence of h in the interaction
rule.
Let vt be the solution to the transport equation (4.6) and µt be the distribution
of p1 (i.e. µt is the first marginal of vt.) This means that vt(A× [0, 1]) = µt(A) for
any Borel set A ⊂ [0, 1], which can be rewritten as∫∫
φ(p1) dvt(p1, p2) =
∫
φ(p1) dµt(p1)
for any measurable non-negative function φ : [0, 1]→ R.
Theorem 5.3. Assume that b > 0 and write the initial condition as
µ0 = (1− a)δ0 + aµ˜0
where a ∈ [0, 1] and µ˜ is a probablity measure on [0, 1] such that µ˜0({0}) = 0. Then
lim
t→+∞µt = (1− a)δ0 + aδ1.
In the same way, if b < 0 and µ0 = (1 − a)δ1 + aµ˜0 where µ˜({1}) = 0 and
a ∈ [0, 1], then µt → (1− a)δ1 + aδ0 as t→ +∞.
Proof. Let us assume that b > 0 (the proof when b < 0 is completely analogous).
It follows from (4.6) that µt satisfies the following equation: for any φ ∈ C1([0, 1]),
(5.7)
1
b
d
dt
∫ 1
0
φdµt =
∫ 1
0
φ′(p1)v[µt](p1) dµt(p1),
where for any probability measure µ on [0, 1] the vector-field v[µ] is defined as
v[µ](p1) = min{p1(1− p1), c}︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(p1)
(p1 + p¯1 − 2p1p¯1),
where
p¯1 =
∫ 1
0
p1 dµ(p1).
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Notice first that since p1, p¯1 ∈ [0, 1] we have
(5.8) v[µ](p1) ≥ h(p1)(p21 + p¯21 − 2p1p¯1) = h(p1)(p1 − p¯1)2.
Hence, it follows that v[µ] ≥ 0. Another consequence is that
(5.9) v[µ] = 0 µ-a.e. ⇔ µ = αδ0 + (1− α)δ1, α ∈ [0, 1].
Indeed, if v[µ](p) = 0 then p1 = 0, 1, p¯1 by (5.8). Thus if v[µ] = 0 µ-a.e. then
µ = αδ0 + βδ1 + γδc for some c ∈ (0, 1) and α, β, γ ≥ 0, α + β + γ = 1. Since
h(c) 6= 0, v[µ](c) = 0 gives c = p¯1 by (5.8) and then 0 = v[µ](c) = h(c)(c+ c− 2c2)
i.e. c = 0 or c = 1 which is an absurd.
Let us recall that µt = Tt]µ0 where Tt is the flow of v[µt](p1), and also that
v[µt](p1) ≥ 0. Thus for any x in the support of µ0, Tt(x) is non-decreasing and
bounded by 1 and thus converge to some T∞(x). Then µt → µ∞ := T∞]µ0.
Moroever, v[µ∞] = 0 µ∞-a.e. and thus µ∞ = (1−α)δ0 +αδ1 for some α ∈ [0, 1]
by (5.9).
To conclude, we have to show that
(5.10) µ∞({0}) = µ0({0}).
Let us take a smooth non-increasing function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that φ = 1
in [0, 1/n] and φ = 0 in [2/n, 1], n ∈ N. Then∫ 1
0
φdµt −
∫ 1
0
φdµ0 =
∫ t
0
∫ 1
0
φ′(p1)v[µs](p1) dµs(p1)ds ≤ 0
Letting t = tk → +∞ we obtain∫ 1
0
φdµ∞ ≤
∫ 1
0
φdµ0
and then µ∞([0, 1/n]) ≤ µ0([0, 2/n]). Letting n → +∞ gives µ∞({0}) ≤ µ0({0}).
To prove the converse inequality recall that µt = Tt]µ0 where Tt is the flow of
v[µt](p1). For any φ ∈ C([0, 1]) we thus have∫ 1
0
φdµt =
∫ 1
0
φ(Tt(p1)) dµ0(p1) = (1− a)φ(0) + a
∫ 1
0
φ(Tt(p1)) dµ˜0(p1)
Letting t = tk → +∞ we obtain
∫ 1
0
φdµ∞ ≥ (1 − a)φ(0) for any nonnegative and
continuous function φ. We deduce that µ∞({0}) ≥ 1− a. This proves (5.10).
We conclude that µt → (1− a)δ0 + aδ1, and this finishes the proof.

Given an initial condition µ0, the distribution µt of p1 is the unique solution (see
(5.7)) of
1
b
∂tµt + ∂p1
(
v[µt](p1)
)
= 0.
In particular if µ0 is a convex combination of Dirac masses like e.g. µ0 =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δpi1(0) with p
1
1(0), . . . , p
N
1 (0) ∈ [0, 1], then µt = 1N
∑N
i=1 δpi1(t) where p
1
1(t), . . . , p
N
1 (t)
are the solutions of the system
d
dt
pi1(t) = v[µ](p
i
1(t))
= min{pi1(1− pi1), c}(pi1(t) + p¯1 − 2pi1(t)p¯1) i = 1, . . . , N,
(5.11)
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Figure 1. Time evolution of the distribution of p11, . . . , p
N
1 solu-
tions of (5.11) with parameter values (5.12) and initial condition
(5.13).
where
p¯1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pi1(t).
We solved numerically the system (5.11) in the time interval [0, T ] using a Runge-
Kutta scheme of order 4 with step size h = 0.1 with the following parameters values:
(5.12) b = 1, c = 0.1, N = 1000, T = 400,
and taking as initial condition
p11(0) = ... = p
300
1 (0) = 0,
pk1(0), k = 301, . . . , N , uniformly and independently distributed in [0, 0.3].
(5.13)
We show in figure 5.3 the resulting evolution of the distributions of the pk1(t),
k = 1, . . . , N . We can see that p11(t) = ... = p
300
1 (t) = 0 for any t, resulting in
the Dirac mass 310δ0. The others p
k
1(t), k = 301, . . . , N , are moving to the right
until reaching 1 thus building up progressively the Dirac mass 710δ1 in complete
agreement with Theorem 5.3.
5.4. Periodic solutions for Paper-Rock-Scissor like games. We now consider
the case of a game for which the solutions of the replicator equations are periodic
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orbits. We have in mind the classic Rock-Paper-Scissor game whose pay-off matrix
is
A =
 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0

In this game strategies dominate each other in a cyclic way as 1 → 2 → 3 → 1.
This can be generalized to a game with an odd number d of strategies considering
the pay-off matrix
(5.14) A :=

0 a1 a2 · · · · · · ad−1
ad−1 0 a1 a2 · · · ad−2
ad−2 ad−1 0 a1 · · · ad−3
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
a1 a2 · · · · · · ad−1 0

with ak = (−1)k−1, k = 1, . . . , d− 1.
It is known that interior trajectories for the replicator equations for these games
are closed periodic orbits enclosing the unique interior Nash equilibrium N := 1d
~1
(see e.g. [35]). In particular
(5.15) NTAN = 0.
Moreover (see Theorem 7.6.4 in [21]) if p(t) is such a trajectory then its temporal
mean converges to N :
limt→+∞
1
t
∫ t
0
p(s) ds = N.
It follows that
(5.16)
1
T
∫ T
0
p(s) ds = N
where T is the period of the trajectory x(t).
Our next result states that the solutions of the mean-field equation equation
(4.6) lying in {h = c} are also periodic.
Theorem 5.4. Consider a solution vt to equation (4.6) with initial condition v0
such that vt is supported in {h = c} for any t ≥ 0. If the initial mean strategy is
different from N then there exists T > 0 such that vt+T = vt for any t ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider a solution vt to equation (4.6) with initial condition v0. Then
vt = Tt]v0 where Tt is the flow of F [vt](p). Thus to prove that vt is periodic, it is
enough to prove that all the trayectories t→ Tt(p), p ∈ supp(v0), are periodic with
the same period. Let p(t) = Tt(p) be such a trajectory. Since h(p(t)) = c for any t,
d
dt
p(t) = F [vt](p(t))
= c(B(t) + C(t)A)p(t)
where
B(t) = diag((Am(t))1, . . . , (Am(t))d), C(t) = diag(m1(t), . . . ,md(t))
m(t) =
∫
∆
p dvt(p).
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Thus
p(t) = exp
(
c
∫ t
0
B(s) + C(s)Ads
)
p(0).
According to Theorem 5.2, m is a solution to the replicator equations for A and
thus is periodic. We denote its period by T . By (5.16) we deduce that
1
T
∫ T
0
m(s) ds = N.
Thus
1
T
∫ T
0
Am(t) ds = A
( 1
T
∫ T
0
m(s) ds
)
= AN = 0.
Recalling that N = 1d
~1,
1
T
∫ T
0
B(s) + C(s)Ads =
1
T
∫ T
0
C(s) ds.A =
1
d
A.
We deduce that
p(T ) = exp
(cT
d
A
)
p(0).
The matrix R := exp
(
cT
d A
)
is orthogonal (being A antisymmetric, exp(At) =
exp(−A) = (expA)−1) and has determinant exp
(
Tr( cTd A)
)
= 1. Thus R ∈ SO(d).
Moreover, RN = (Id+ cTd A+ ...)N = N so we get that R is a rotation around
the line (ON). Since this line is perpendicular to the plane {p1 + · · ·+ pd = 1}, the
matrix R is a rotation in this plane fixing N .
We thus obtain that any trajectory p(t) starting from p(0) ∈ supp(v0) satisfies
p(T ) = Rp(0)
where T is the period of m and R is a rotation in {p1 + · · ·+ pd = 1} fixing N . It
follows in particular that vT = R]v0 and m(T ) = Rm(0). Since m(T ) = m(0) by
definition of T , we obtain that m(0) is a another fixed-point of R. Thus if N 6= m(0)
then R = Id so that vT = v0. Since the solution to the mean-field equation (4.6)
with a given intial condition is unique, we deduce that vt+T = vt for any t ≥ 0.
The proof is finished 
Remark 5.1. Let us note that, given a ball B centered at N , any trajectory of the
replicator equations starting at some p ∈ B ∩ {p1 + · · ·+ pd = 1} cannot reach the
boundary of ∆, since whenever a coordinate of p(t) is equal to zero, it remains zero
for every t. So, choosing B sufficiently small, all the trajectories remain in the set
{h = c}.
Assuming that supp(v0) ⊂ B, we get that supp(vt) ⊂ {h = c}.
6. Appendix
6.1. Existence of solution to the Boltzmann-like equation: proof of The-
orem 4.1. Given an initial condition u0 ∈ P(∆) we want to prove that there exists
a unique u ∈ C([0,∞),P(∆)) such that∫
∆
ϕ(p) dut(p) =
∫
∆
ϕ(p) du0(p) +
∫ t
0
∫
∆2
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)] dus(p)dus(p˜)ds(6.1)
for any ϕ ∈ C(∆).
We split the proof into two steps.
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Step 1. There is a unique u ∈ C([0,∞),M(∆)) satisfying (6.1).
Recall that M(∆) denotes the space of finite Borel measures on ∆ that we endow,
unless otherwise stated, with the total-variation norm.
Proof. Given u, v ∈M(∆) we define a finite measure Q(u, v) on ∆ by
〈Q(u, v), ϕ〉 := 1
2
∫
∆3
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)] du(p)dv(p˜) + 1
2
∫
∆3
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)] dv(p)du(p˜)
for ϕ ∈ C(∆). We also let Q(u) := Q(u, u). For u ∈ C([0,+∞],M(∆)) we then
define a map J(u) : [0,+∞)→M(∆) by
J(u)t := u0 +
∫ t
0
Q(us) ds, t ≥ 0,
that is,
(J(u)t, ϕ) := (u0, ϕ) +
∫ t
0
(Q(us), ϕ) ds for any ϕ ∈ C(∆).
We thus look for a fixed point of J in C([0,+∞],M(∆)). We will apply Banach
fixed-point theorem to J in the complete metric space
A := {u ∈ C([0, T ],M(∆)) : u(0) = u0 and max
0≤s≤T
‖us‖TV ≤ 2}
where T ∈ (0, 1/8).
Let us verify that J(A) ⊆ A. First notice that
(6.2) ‖Q(u, v)‖TV ≤ 2‖u‖TV ‖v‖TV .
Moreover, Q is bilinear so that Q(u)−Q(v) = Q(u+ v, u− v) and then
(6.3) ‖Q(u)−Q(v)‖TV ≤ 2‖u+ v‖‖u− v‖TV .
Now for any u, v ∈ A, and any t ∈ [0, T ],
‖J(u)t)‖TV ≤ ‖u0‖TV +
∫ t
0
‖Q(vs)‖TV ds
≤ 1 + 2T max
0≤s≤T
‖vs‖2TV
≤ 1 + 8T ≤ 2.
Moreover, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
‖J(u)t − J(u)s‖TV ≤
∫ t
s
‖Q(uτ )‖TV dτ ≤ 2
∫ t
s
‖uτ‖2TV dτ ≤ 8|t− s|,
and we deduce the continuity of J(u)t in t. Thus J(A) ⊂ A.
Now, for any u, v ∈ A, using (6.3),
‖J(u)t − J(v)t‖ ≤
∫ t
0
‖Q(us)−Q(vs)‖ ds
≤
∫ t
0
2‖us + vs‖‖us − vs‖ ds
≤ 8T‖u− v‖,
so that
‖J(u)− J(v)‖ ≤ 8T‖u− v‖.
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY IN MIXED STRATEGIES 21
Thus choosing T < 1/8, we deduce that J is a strict contraction from A to A
and therefore, has a unique fixed-point. Repeating the argument on [T, 2T ], . . ., we
obtain a unique u ∈ C([0,+∞],M(∆)) satisfying (6.1). 
Notice that it is not a priori obvious that J(u)t ≥ 0 if ut ≥ 0, t ≥ 0. We verify
that ut ≥ 0 in an indirect way in the next Step following ideas from [10].
Step 2. ut is a probability measure on ∆ for any t ≥ 0 where u is given by the
previous Step.
Proof. We first verify that ut is a non-negative measure for any t ≥ 0 i.e.
(ut, ϕ) ≥ 0 for any ϕ ∈ C(∆), ϕ ≥ 0.
Given u, v ∈M(∆) we define the measures
Q+(u, v) :=
1
2
∫
∆3
E[ϕ(p∗)] (du(p)dv(p˜) + dv(p)du(p˜))
and Q+(v) := Q+(v, v). Notice that Q+(u, v) is non-negative if both u and v are
non-negative. Moreover,
(6.4) Q(u) = Q+(u)− u
and
(6.5) Q+(u) ≥ Q+(v) ≥ 0 if u ≥ v ≥ 0
since Q+(u)−Q+(v) = Q+(u+ v, u− v) ≥ 0.
The idea of the proof consists in finding v ∈ C([0,∞),P(∆)) (continuity with
respect to the total variation norm) such that
(6.6) vt = e
−tu0 +
∫ t
0
es−tQ+(vs) ds.
Indeed in that case using (6.4),
d
dt
vt = −e−tu0 −
∫ t
0
es−tQ+(vs) ds+Q+(vt)
= Q+(vt)− vt
= Q(vt).
Thus, vt verifies (6.1) so that v = u since u is the unique solution of (6.1).
To obtain v satisfying (6.6) we consider the sequence v(n) ∈ C([0,+∞), P (∆)),
n ∈ N, defined by v(0) := 0 and
v
(n)
t := e
−tu0 +
∫ t
0
es−tQ+(v(n−1)s ) ds.
Recalling that u0 ≥ 0 and using (6.5) it is easily seen that v(n)t ≥ v(n−1)t ≥ 0. Also
notice that
(v
(1)
t , 1) = e
−t +
∫ t
0
es−t(Q+(u0), 1) ds = (Q+(u0), 1) = (Q(u0), 1) + (u0, 1) = 1
where we used (6.4) and the fact that (Q(u), 1) = 0 for any u ∈M(∆). Notice that
the function (v
(n)
t , 1) satisfies the ordinary differential equation{
d
dt (v
(n)
t , 1) = (Q+(v
(n−1)
t ), 1)− (v(n)t , 1) = (v(n−1)t , 1)− (v(n)t , 1),
(v
(n)
t=0, 1) = (u0, 1) = 1.
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We can then prove by induction that (v
(n)
t , 1) = 1 for any n and t. Thus for any
t ≥ 0, (v(n)t )n is a non-decreasing sequence of probability measures on ∆. We can
then define a probability measure vt on ∆ by
(vt, φ) := lim
n→+∞(v
(n)
t , φ) φ ∈ C(∆).
In fact the convergence of v(n) to v is uniform in t ∈ [0, T ] for any T > 0, and
thus v is continuous in t. This follows from the Arzela-Ascoli thorem. Indeed,
since ‖v(n)t ‖TV = 1, we only need to prove that the sequence (v(n)t )n is uniformly
equicontinuous. We have
‖v(n)t+h − v(n)t ‖TV ≤ |et+h − et|‖u0‖TV +
∫ t+h
t
es−(t+h)‖Q+(v(n−1)s )‖TV ds
+
∫ t
0
|es−(t+h) − es−t|‖Q+(v(n−1)s )‖TV ds.
In view of (6.2) and recalling that v
(n−1)
s ∈ P(∆) we have ‖Q+(v(n−1)s )‖TV ≤
‖Q(v(n−1)s )‖TV + ‖v(n−1)s ‖TV ≤ 3. The uniform equi-continuity follows easily.
This ends the proof. 
To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1, we verify that u ∈ C1((0,+∞),M(∆))
with ∂tut = Q(ut). Indeed, recalling that ut = J(u)t, we have
ut+h − ut
h
−Q(ut) = 1
h
∫ t+h
t
Q(us) ds−Q(ut) = 1
h
∫ t+h
t
Q(us)−Q(ut) ds.
Using (6.3) together with ‖ut‖TV = 1 we obtain∥∥∥ut+h − ut
h
−Q(ut)
∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2
h
∫ t+h
t
‖us + ut‖TV ‖us − ut‖TV ds
≤ 4
h
∫ t+h
t
‖us − ut‖TV ds
which goes to 0 as h → 0 by the Dominated Convergence Theorem since us is
continuous in s for the total variation norm.
6.2. Grazing limit: proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof consists in two main
steps. First approzimating the difference ϕ(p∗)−ϕ(p) in the Boltzmann-like equa-
tion (4.1) by a second order Taylor expansion, we obtain that uδ is an approximate
s solution of (4.2) in the sense of (4.5). Then we apply Arzela-Ascoli Theorem to
deduce that a subsequence of the uδ converges to a solution of (4.5).
Before beginning the proof we need the following lemma which gives the expected
value of of f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
fi(ζ, p)− fi(ζ˜, p˜)
)
where the random vector f(ζ; p) =
(f1(ζ; p), . . . , fd(ζ; p)) is defined in (3.3).
Lemma 6.1. For any i, j = 1, . . . , d, any p, p˜ ∈ ∆ and any independent random
variables ζ, ζ˜ uniformly distributed in [0, 1], there hold
(6.7) E
[
f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
fi(ζ, p)− fi(ζ˜, p˜)
)]
=
d∑
k=1
aik(pip˜k + pkp˜i).
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Proof. Let us denote fi = fi(ζ, p) and f˜i = fi(ζ˜, p˜). The proof is based on the
following two properties of the fi:
fifj = δij and f
2
i = fi,
which follows from the definition of f(ζ, p). We write
f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
fi(ζ, p)− fi(ζ˜, p˜)
)
=
d∑
m,n=1
amnfmfn
(
fi − fi
)
=
d∑
n=1
ainfifn −
d∑
m=1
amifmfi.
Since ζ and ζ˜ are independent, so are fi(ζ, p) and fj(ζ˜, p˜) for any i, j = 1, . . . , d.
Moreover E[fi(ζ, p)] = pi since fi(ζ, p) = 1 with probability pi and fi(ζ, p) = 0 with
probability 1− pi. Taking the expectation in (6.2) we thus obtain
E
[
f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
fi(ζ, p)− fi(ζ˜, p˜)
)]
=
d∑
n=1
ainpip˜m −
d∑
m=1
amipmp˜i.
We deduce (6.7) recalling that aij = −aji being A antisymmetric.
The proof is finished. 
We are now in position to prove Theorem 4.2. We split the proof into several
Steps. The first one states that uδ is an approximate s solution of (4.2) in the sense
of (4.5).
Step 3. For any φ ∈ C3(∆),
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ)−
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, 0)
=
∫ t
0
∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [uδ(s)](p)duδ(p, s)ds+ r
2
2δ
∫ t
0
∫
∆
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ijϕ(p)G(p)
2 duδ(p, s)ds
+
∫ t
0
Error(s, δ)ds
(6.8)
where
(6.9) |Error(s, δ)| ≤ 1
δ
C‖D3ϕ‖∞(δ3 + r3)2 + C‖D2φ‖∞δ,
and the constant C is independent of t, φ, δ and r.
Proof. First, for any test-function φ we have
d
dτ
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ) =
1
δ
d
dt
∫
∆
ϕ(p) du(p, t)
=
1
δ
∫
∆2
E
[
ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t).
Performing a Taylor expansion up to the second order we have
ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p) =
d∑
i=1
∂iϕ(p)(p
∗
i − pi) +
1
2
d∑
i,j=1
∂ijϕ(p)(p
∗
i − pi)(p∗j − pj) +R(p∗, p)
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where
(6.10) |R(p∗, p)| ≤ 1
6
‖D3ϕ‖∞|p∗ − p|3.
Thus, ∫
∆2
E
[
ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t)
=
∫
∆2
d∑
i=1
∂iϕ(p)E
[
p∗i − pi
]
+
1
2
d∑
i,j=1
∂ijϕ(p)E
[
(p∗i − pi)(p∗j − pj)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t)
+
∫
∆2
E
[
R(p∗, p)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t).
(6.11)
We examine each term in the right hand side. In view of the interaction rule
(3.4), namely
p∗ − p = δh(p)f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
f(ζ, p)− f(ζ˜, p˜)
)
+ r(q −~1/d)G(p),
we have
E[p∗i − pi] = δh(p)E
[
f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)
(
fi(ζ, p)− fi(ζ˜, p˜)
)]
+ E[r(qi − 1/d)G(p)].
If q is a random variable uniformly distributed on ∆, then E[qi] = 1/d. So, in view
of (6.7) in the previous Lemma, we obtain
E[p∗i − pi] = δh(p)
d∑
k=1
aik(pip˜k + pkp˜i).
By integrating we get
∫
∆2
d∑
i=1
∂iϕ(p)E
[
p∗i − pi
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t)
= δ
∫
∆
h(p)
d∑
i=1
∂iϕ(p)
d∑
k=1
aik(pip¯k(t) + pkp¯i(t))du(p, t)
= δ
∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [ut](p)du(p, t),
(6.12)
where the vector-field F is defined in (4.3).
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We now study E
[
(p∗i − pi)(p∗j − pj)
]
. In view of the interaction rule,
(p∗i − pi)(p∗j − pj) =
[
δh(p)f(ζ)TAf(ζ˜)
(
fi(ζ)− fi(ζ˜)
)
+ r(qi − 1/d)G(p)
]
×
[
δh(p)f(ζ)TAf(ζ˜)
(
fj(ζ)− fj(ζ˜)
)
+ r(qj − 1/d)G(p)
]
=
(
δh(p)f(ζ)TAf(ζ˜)
)2(
fi(ζ)− fi(ζ˜)
)(
fj(ζ)− fj(ζ˜)
)
+ δh(p)f(ζ)TAf(ζ˜)
(
fi(ζ)− fi(ζ˜)
)
r(qj − 1/d)G(p)
+ δh(p)f(ζ)TAf(ζ˜)
(
fj(ζ)− fj(ζ˜)
)
r(qi − 1/d)G(p)
+ r2(qi − 1/d)(qj − 1/d)G(p)2.
The second and third term have zero expected value since q is independent of ζ and
ζ˜ and E[qi] = 1/d. Moreover, in view of the definition (4.4) of Q, the expectation
of the last term is r2G(p)2Qij . Lastly, since |fi(ζ, p)| ≤ 1 for any i = 1, . . . , d and
any p ∈ ∆, the expectation of the first term can be bounded by Cδ2 for a constant
C depending only on c and the coefficients of A. Thus
E
[
(p∗i − pi)(p∗j − pj)
]
= r2G(p)2Qij +O(δ
2).
By integrating,∫
∆2
d∑
i,j=1
∂ijϕ(p)E
[
(p∗i − pi)(p∗j − pj)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t)
= r2
∫
∆2
G(p)2
d∑
i,j=1
∂ijϕ(p)Qijdu(p, t) +O(δ
2)‖D2φ‖∞.
(6.13)
It remains to bound the error term∫
∆2
E
[
R(p∗, p)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t) ≤ 1
6
‖D3ϕ‖∞
∫
∆2
E
[
|p∗ − p|3
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t).
Using that (a + b)3 ≤ C(a3 + b3) for any a, b ≥ 0, |G(p)| ≤ 1, |h(p)| ≤ c, and
|f(ζ)TAf(ζ˜)| ≤∑di,j=1 |aij |fi(ζ, p)fi(ζ˜ ,˜p) ≤∑di,j=1 |aij |, we have
|p∗ − p|3 ≤
∣∣∣δh(p)f(ζ, p)TAf(ζ˜, p˜)(f(ζ, p)− f(ζ˜, p˜))+ r(q −~1/d)G(p)∣∣∣3
≤ Cδ3c3
( d∑
i,j=1
|aij |
)3
+ Cr3 = C(δ3 + r3).
Thus, ∫
∆2
E
[
R(p∗, p)
]
du(p, t)du(p˜, t) ≤ C‖D3ϕ‖∞(δ3 + r3).(6.14)
By inserting (6.12), (6.13) and (6.14) into (6.11), we obtain (6.8). 
We now verify that the sequence (uδ) verifies the assumptions of Arzela-Ascoli
Theorem, namely boundedness and uniform equicontinuity. The proof is based
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of the previous Step. Since the error term (6.9) involves ‖φ‖C3 , the Wasserstein
distance is of no use. Instead we will use the norm ‖u‖sup, u ∈ P (∆), defined by
(6.15) ‖u‖sup := sup
{∫
∆
ϕ(p) du(p) tal que ϕ ∈ C3(∆,R) y ‖ϕ‖3 ≤ 1
}
.
where the supremum is taken over all the function φ ∈ C3(∆) such that ‖ϕ‖3 ≤ 1
where
(6.16) ‖ϕ‖3 :=
∑
|α|≤3
‖∂αϕ‖∞.
According to [18] this norm metricizes the weak convergence in P (∆).
Step 4. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and any δ > 0,
(6.17) ‖uδ(·, τ)‖sup ≤ 1.
Moreover there exists a constant K > 0 such that for any τ, τ ′ ∈ [0, T ] and any
r, δ > 0 small,
(6.18) ‖uδ(·, τ)− uδ(·, τ ′)‖sup ≤ K |τ − τ ′|.
Proof. First for any φ ∈ C3(∆), ‖φ‖C3 ≤ 1, recalling that uδ(., τ) is a probability
measure, we clearly have∫
∆
ψ(p) duδ(p, τ) ≤
∫
∆
|ψ(p)| duδ(p, τ) ≤
∫
∆
duδ(p, τ)1.
We deduce (6.17) taking the supremum over all such φ.
To prove (6.18) we write using (6.8) that for any φ ∈ C3(), ‖φ‖C3 ≤ 1,
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ)−
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ
′)
=
∫ τ
τ ′
∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [us](p)du(p, s)ds+ r
2
2δ
∫ τ
τ ′
∫
∆
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ijϕ(p)G(p)
2 duδ(p, s)ds
+
∫ τ
τ ′
Error(s, δ)ds
(6.19)
Since ∆ is bounded we have |F [us](p)| ≤ C. Thus∣∣∣ ∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ)−
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ
′)
∣∣∣
≤ C
(
‖∇φ‖∞ + r2/δ‖D2ϕ‖∞ + 1
δ
‖D3ϕ‖∞(δ3 + r3)
)
|τ − τ ′|
≤ C(1 + r2/δ).
Since we assumed that r2/δ → λ, we obtain (6.18). 
We fix T > 0. The space P (∆) is compact for the weak convergence (and so
for the norm ‖.‖sup). In view of the previous Step we can apply Arzela-Ascoli
Theorem to the sequence of continuous functions uδ : [0, T ]→ P(∆) to obtain that
a subsequence converges uniformly as δ → 0.
A diagonal argument shows in fact that a subsequence, that we still denote (uδ),
converges in C([0, T ],P(∆)) for any T > 0 to some v ∈ C([0,+∞),P(∆)).
We now verify that v satisfies (4.5).
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Step 5. v satisfies (4.5).
Proof. We need to pass to the limit in (6.8) as δ → 0. We fix some φ ∈ C3(∆) and
t > 0, and recall that r2/δ → λ. Then it is easily seen the last term in the right
hand side of (6.8) can be bounded by C‖φ‖C3t(δ+ r.r2/δ)→ 0. Let us pass to the
limit in the second term in the right hand side. For a fixed s ∈ [0, t], we write∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [uδ(s)](p)duδ(p, s)ds
=
∫
∆
∇φ(p)(F [uδ(s)](p)−F [u(s)](p))duδ(p, s)ds
+
∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [u(s)](p)duδ(p, s)ds.
(6.20)
Notice that
F [uδ(s)](p)−F [u(s)](p) = h(p)(pieTi Amδ(s) +mδi (s)eTi Ap)
where
mδ(s) =
∫
∆
p˜ d(uδ(s, p˜)− u(s, p˜)).
Since uδ(s)→ v(s) weakly uniformly in s ∈ [0, t], we also have that
W1(uδ(s), v(s))→ 0
uniformly in s ∈ [0, t]. Thus mδ(s) → 0 and then F [uδ(s)](p) → F [u(s)](p) uni-
formly in p ∈ ∆. We deduce that the first term in the right hand side of (6.20)
goes to 0. The second term also goes to 0 since ∇φ and F [u(s)] are Lipschitz.
Moreover,∣∣∣ ∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [uδ(s)](p)duδ(p, s)
∣∣∣ ≤ ‖∇φ‖∞‖F [uδ(s)]‖∞ ≤ C.
We then conclude that∫ t
0
∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [uδ(s)](p)duδ(p, s)ds→
∫ t
0
∫
∆
∇φ(p)F [u(s)](p)du(p, s)ds
applying the Dominated Convergence Theorem. We can prove in the same way
that the second term in the right hand side of (6.8) converges to
λ
∫ t
0
∫
∆
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ijϕ(p)G(p)
2 du(p, s)ds.

To conclude the proof it remains to study the case where r2/δα → λ > 0 for
some α in(0, 1). In that case we rescale time considering τ = δαt. Reasoning as
before we can write
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∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ)−
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, τ
′)
=
∫ τ
τ ′
d
dτ
∫
∆
ϕ(p) duδ(p, s)ds
=
1
δα
∫ τ
τ ′
∫
E[ϕ(p∗)− ϕ(p)]duδ(p, s)duδ(p˜, s)
= δ1−α
∫ τ
τ ′
∫
∆
∇φF [uδ(s)] duδ(p, s) + r
2
2δα
∫
∆
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ijϕ(p)G(p)
2 duδ(p, s)
+
1
δα
∫
∆2
E[R(p∗, p)]duδ(p, s)duδ(p˜, s).
In view of (6.14) and recalling that we assume r2/δα → λ, the last term can be
bounded by
C‖φ‖C3(δ3−α + r.r2/δα) + Cδ2−α‖D2φ‖∞ ≤ C‖φ‖C3(δ + r).
It follows that Step 4 still holds and thus, applying Arzela-Ascoli Theorem, we
obtain that a subsequence, that we still denote (uδ), converges in C([0, T ],P(∆))
for any T > 0 to some v ∈ C([0,+∞),P(∆)). Passing to the limit δ → 0 as in Step
5, we deduce that v satisfies∫
∆
ϕ(p) dv(p, τ) =
∫
∆
ϕ(p) dv(p, τ ′) +
∫ τ
τ ′
λ
2
∫
∆
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ijϕ(p)G(p)
2 dv(p, s)ds
which is the weak formulation of
d
dτ
v =
λ
2
d∑
i,j=1
Qij∂ij(G
2 v).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
6.3. Well-posedness of equation (4.6). Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let us fix
some v ∈ C([0,+∞], P (∆)) and denote F(t, p) := F [v(t)](p), namely
Fi(t, p) = h(p)(pieTi Ap¯(t) + p¯i(t)eTi Ap), p¯(t) =
∫
∆
p dvt(p).
Notice that ~1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rd is normal to ∆ and that for any p ∈ ∆,
~1.F(t, p) =
d∑
i=1
Fi(t, p) = h(p)(p.Ap¯(t) + p¯(t).Ap) = 0
since A is antisymmetric, and
F(t, p) = 0 for any p ∈ ∂∆
since h(p) = 0 if p ∈ ∂∆. It follows that any integral curve of F(t, p) starting from
a point in ∆ stays in the compact ∆ forever. Let us denote T vs,t the flow of the
vector field F(t, p) namely
d
dt
T vs,t(p) = F [v(t)](T vs,t(p)), Ts,stv(p) = p.
We also let T vt (p) := T
v
0,t(p). We then have
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Lemma 6.2. There holds
T vt (p) ∈ ∆ for any p ∈ ∆ and any t ≥ 0.
The characteristic method allows to show in a standard way that the equation
d
dt
u+ div(F [v(t)](p)u) = 0
with initial condition u0 ∈ P (∆) has a unique solution in C([0,+∞], P (∆)) given
by u(t) = T vt ]u0.
Thus proving the existence of a unique solution to
(6.21)
d
dt
v + div(F [v(t)](p)v) = 0
for a given initial condition v0 ∈ P (∆) is equivalent to proving the existence of a
solution to the fixed-point equation
(6.22) v(t) = T vt ]v0.
This can be done applying the Banach fixed-point theorem to the map Γ(v)t :=
T vt ]v0 in the complete metric space {v ∈ C([0, T ], P (∆)), v(0) = v0} for a small
enough T > 0 depending on ‖v0‖TV . The details of the proof are an adaptation
of e.g. [9]. The adaptation is almost straight forward noticing that F [v(t)](p) is
bounded Lipschitz in p uniformly in t for a given v ∈ C([0, T ], P (∆)). We can then
repeat the process on [T, 2T ], [2T, 3T ],. . . to obtain v ∈ C([0,+∞], P (∆)) satisfying
(6.22) which is thus the unique solution to (6.21) with initial condition v0. The
continuity with respect to initial conditions can also be obtained following the proof
of [9].
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